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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-OVERBREADTH Doc-
TRINE-HATE CRIMES-PENALTY ENHANCEMENT-The United
States Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute, which, in in-
creasing a defendant's sentence because the defendant chose his
victim solely on the basis of the victim's race, ethnicity, religion or
sexual orientation, takes into consideration a defendant's speech
and beliefs that evidence prejudice based on race, ethnicity, reli-
gion and sexual orientation, was not overbroad and did not violate
the defendant's First Amendment rights of free speech.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
On the night of October 7, 1989, Gregory Reddick, a fourteen-
year old white male, was severely beaten by a group of young black
men and boys.' For his part in the crime, Todd Mitchell ("Mitch-
ell") was convicted of aggravated battery and being party to a
crime under the Wisconsin Criminal Code.2 Ordinarily, that of-
fense carries a maximum sentence of two years.3 However, because
the jury found that Mitchell had chosen his victim solely on the
basis of the victim's race," the maximum sentence was increased to
seven years.6 Subsequently, the Circuit Court of Kenosha County,
1. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). The beating rendered Reddick un-
conscious and placed him in a coma for four days. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Prior to the commission of the offense, some members of the group Mitchell
was with had been discussing the motion picture Mississippi Burning. Id. at 2196-97. The
discussion centered specifically upon one scene in which a white man had beaten a young
black boy who was praying. Id. Subsequently, Mitchell addressed the group saying, "Do you
all feel hyped up to move on some white people?" Id. Shortly thereafter, Reddick ap-
proached Mitchell and the group on the opposite side of the street. Id. Mitchell said, "You
all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him." Id. at 2196-97. Mitchell
then counted to three and indicated the group should surround Reddick. Id.
5. Id. af 2197. The Wisconsin Criminal Code provides for the enhancement of a
defendant's sentence if the defendant intentionally selected the victim because of the vic-
tim's race. Id. The relevant statute reads, in part:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are
increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is
committed . . . because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin or ancestry of that person ...
WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-1990).
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Wisconsin sentenced Mitchell to four years imprisonment.' Follow-
ing his conviction, Mitchell appealed to the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals.7 He claimed that the penalty enhancement statute, by
which his sentence had been increased two years, was vague and
overbroad and violated equal protection principles.8 The court of
appeals, however, rejected Mitchell's argument holding that the
statute was not vague because it gave adequate notice and pro-
vided adequate standards for enforcement."
The court disagreed with Mitchell's argument that the statute
punished free speech,1" stating that the statute was directed at the
action of selecting a victim, rather than at speech.1" It therefore
concluded that the statute was not overbroad. 2 For these reasons,
the court concluded that Mitchell had failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statute was unconstitutional.13
From the court of appeals, Mitchell appealed his case to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.1 4 In reversing the decision of the court
of appeals, the supreme court agreed with Mitchell's argument
that the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute was overbroad 5
6. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197.
7. State v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
8. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees to every person equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. It states that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ... nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals re-
fused to address Mitchell's equal protection argument, holding that he had waived his claim
on that issue. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d at 3.
9. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d at 4. The court referred to a two-step process for determin-
ing vagueness claims. It held that: '(1) the statute must be sufficiently definite to give per-
sons of ordinary intelligence who seek to avoid its penalties fair notice of the conduct re-
quired or prohibited; and (2) the statute must provide standards for those who enforce the
laws and adjudicate guilt." Id. (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 6. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d at 6.
12. Id. at 5. The court described an overbroad statute as one in which the language is
so broad that its sanctions may extend to conduct that was protected by the Constitution
and that the state could not regulate. Id.
13. Id. at 3. Generally, when challenging the constitutionality of a statute, a defend-
ant has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. How-
ever, when a statute infringes upon First Amendment rights, the burden to prove the consti-
tutionality of the statute shifts to its proponent. Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held
that the statute did not violate Mitchell's First Amendment rights. Id. at 6. Therefore, the
burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the statute was Mitchell's. Id. at 3.
14. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
15. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 808. The court stated that the danger of an overbroad
law is its chilling effect. Id. at 815. That is, it deters citizens from exercising their protected
constitutional freedoms. Id. at 815. The court further stated that it was not necessary that
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and unconstitutionally infringed upon his rights of free speech.1 6
The supreme court also addressed and rejected an argument that
the hate crimes statute was analogous to anti-discrimination laws
which have been consistently upheld by the United States Su-
preme Court. 7
Unsatisfied with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, the
State of Wisconsin ("State") sought a writ of certiorari from the
U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the penalty enhancement stat-
ute was not unconstitutional.18 Due to the importance of the ques-
tion presented and the conflict among state high courts on the
question of constitutionality of penalty enhancement statutes, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari." In reversing the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Court, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the application of Wisconsin's
penalty enhancement statute to increase Mitchell's sentence did
not violate his First Amendment rights.20
So that it could address the effect of the penalty .enhancement
statute on Mitchell's First Amendment rights, the Court first dis-
pensed with his argument that the Court was bound by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court's conclusion that the statute punished him
for having bigoted thoughts, rather than punished him for his con-
duct.2' Thus, the Court held that it could independently conclude
the statute had a chilling effect upon Mitchell; it was sufficient that Mitchell used hypothet-
ical situations to illustrate the chilling effect it could have on others. Id.
16. Id. at 809. An individual's constitutional right to free speech is guaranteed by the
First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of
speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The court did not address Mitchell's vagueness or due pro-
cess claims. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809.
17. Id. at 816. This argument was made in an amicus curiae brief by the Anti-Defa-
mation League. Id. at 816. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding the
Minnesota Human Rights Act constitutional in requiring Jaycees to accept women for mem-
bership); Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that consideration for a
partnership in a law firm was a term, condition, or privilege of employment for purposes of
Title VII employment discrimination provisions); and Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976) (holding that racial discrimination by private schools was a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished the anti-discrimination statutes upheld in
the above cases from the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute, stating that where the
former seek to prohibit a discriminatory act, the latter is aimed not at punishing an act, but
is aimed instead at punishing a mental process, a defendant's selection of the victim. Mitch-
ell, 485 N.W.2d at 817.
18. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199.
19. Id. at 2198.
20. Id. at 2202. The Court's decision was unanimous and only one opinion was issued.
21. Id. at 2198. Although the Court agreed that it was bound by a state court's con-
struction of a statute with respect to definitions of particular words or phrases, it found that
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what effect the statute had on Mitchell's First Amendment
rights.22
The Court began its analysis of the statute's constitutionality
with a discussion of what judges traditionally consider when sen-
tencing a defendant. 3 It stated that motive is almost always a sig-
nificant factor,24 especially where the motive is an aggravating cir-
cumstance.25 Citing its holding in Dawson v. Delaware,6 the Court
cautioned, however, that a defendant's abstract beliefs should not
be considered by a sentencing judge, no matter how offensive or
obnoxious those beliefs may be.27
In its discussion, the Court analogized Mitchell's case to its pre-
vious decision in Barclay v. Florida.2" In Barclay, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of a judge's consideration of racial bias
in sentencing a defendant to death, because the racial bias was
found to have been the defendant's main motive for the crime.
2 9
Applying the standards of Barclay and Dawson, the Court held
that in Mitchell's case, his thoughts and beliefs were not abstract,
but were relevant to the determination of motive.30 Therefore, they
could be considered by the sentencing judge in determining Mitch-
ell's sentence, and such consideration did not violate his First
Amendment rights.31
The Court also addressed the argument made in the lower court
that a penalty enhancement statute was analogous to anti-discrim-
ination statutes.32 In opposition to the rationale proffered by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Court held that the two types of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not define any words or phrases used in the statute. Id.
Rather, the Court asserted that the state court only construed the statute in light of its
effect on the First Amendment. Id. at 2199.
22. Id.
23. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Court pointed out that in some states, the motive of financial gain in
committing murder is an aggravating factor used in determining a defendant's sentence. Id.
26. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). The Court in Dawson refused to allow the introduction of
the defendant's racial biases into evidence at a sentencing hearing, holding that the biases
were not proven to be related to his commission of the crime. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1097-98.
See notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
27. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
28. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). See notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
29. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 949. The defendant in Barclay was a member of the Black
Liberation Army and was found to have wanted to start a race war. Id. at 942-43.
30. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
31. Id.




statutes were similar, and thus, the penalty enhancement statute
was constitutional.
3 3
In upholding the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute, the
Court also looked to the State's policy objectives in enacting the
statute.3 4 In doing so, it rejected the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
finding that the state was trying to punish what it considered to be
offensive thought.3 5 Instead, the Court found that Wisconsin was
promoting legitimate state interests in the health and welfare of its
citizens.3 6
After concluding that the statute did not violate Mitchell's First
Amendment rights by suppressing his freedom of speech, 37 the
Court turned its attention to Mitchell's overbreadth argument.
3 8
Distinguishing Mitchell's case from its decision in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul,3 9 which held that a bias-motivated hate crime statute was
unconstitutional, the Court quickly rejected this argument.4 °
Mitchell argued that, because of the statute, a defendant's prior
speech or association would be used to prove he intentionally se-
lected his victim because of the victim's race or other protected
status.4' Therefore, Mitchell argued, the penalty-enhancement
statute would chill the speech of a person who might in the future
commit a crime and be subject to an enhanced sentence.2 The
Court held that the hypothetical situation proffered by Mitchell's
argument was so farfetched that it was unlikely such an event
would ever occur.42
33. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
34. Id. at 2201.
35. Id. In its decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the statute was
merely seeking to "criminalize bigoted thought." Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 815.
36. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. The Court noted that conduct such as Mitchell's
tends to provoke retaliatory crimes and incite community unrest. Id. The state's desire to
prevent this perceived harm, the Court said, was a legitimate policy objective. Id.
37. Id. at 2202.
38. Id. at 2201. The main thrust of Mitchell's argument, as supported by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, was that evidence of a defendant's prior speech would be used to deter-
mine whether he intentionally chose his victim because of the victim's race. Id. Such prac-
tice, Mitchell argued, if allowed, would have a chilling effect on the free speech of those who
would be concerned about being subject to penalty enhancement if they should commit a
crime covered by the statute. Id. See note 15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"chilling effect."
39. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). See notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
40. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. The Court stated that whereas the statute in RA.
specifically targeted expression, the statute in Mitchell was targeted at conduct not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that "the sort of chill envisioned here is far
1994 943
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Because Mitchell's beliefs were essential to proving the motive
and aggravating circumstances of the crime, 4 the Court held that
they could be legitimately considered in determining his sen-
tence. 5 It further held that the State was not punishing Mitchell
for his abstract beliefs, but was only taking into consideration one
element of what a judge normally considers when sentencing a de-
fendant.'6 In addition, the Court found that the State was doing
more that just disagreeing with Mitchell's beliefs; it was promoting
a legitimate state interest in enacting a penalty enhancement stat-
ute.' 7 Therefore, it concluded that the statute providing for the en-
hancement of Mitchell's sentence neither limited his freedom of
speech as to his mental thoughts and processes nor was over-
broad.'8 Consequently, the Court held that the Wisconsin penalty
enhancement statute did not violate Mitchell's First Amendment
rights.'9
The history of the First Amendment and its guarantee of free
speech is varied and complex. This casenote will explore the his-
tory of the First Amendment as it relates to hate crimes and pen-
alty enhancement statutes in three stages. The first stage to be ad-
dressed will be the origins of freedom of speech, including the
Supreme Court's development of various tests for determining
when free speech can be regulated. The next stage will address the
Supreme Court's attempt to define what "speech" is by classifying
different kinds of speech as protected and non-protected by the
First Amendment and its inclusion of "conduct" into the definition
of "speech." The third and final stage will show how criminal de-
fendants have used the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech to attack the constitutionality of penalty-enhancement
statutes.
Freedom of expression has been guaranteed in the United States
since the Constitutional Convention of 1789 and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights.5" It was not until 1919, however, that the right
more attenuated and unlikely to occur than that contemplated in traditional 'overbreadth'
cases," and it "is simply too speculative a hypothesis to support Mitchell's overbreadth
claim." Id.
44. Id. at 2199.
45. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2200.
48. Id. at 2201.
49. Id. at 2202.
50. JOSEPH J. HEMMER, JR.. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1986).
The delegates of the Constitutional Convention met to adopt the Constitution, and at the
Vol. 32:939944
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of free speech contained in the First Amendment faced judicial
scrutiny. In the landmark case of Schenck v. United States,51 the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the 1917 Espio-
nage Act.2 In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the peti-
tioners' convictions, rejecting their argument that the Espionage
Act abridged their freedoms of speech and petition as established
by the First Amendment."
The importance of the Court's decision in Schenck was the crea-
tion of the "clear and present danger" test. 4 In an opinion written
by Justice Holmes, the Court made it clear that the First Amend-
ment right of free speech was not absolute, stating that speech
could be regulated when it created a "clear and present danger" of
bringing about certain evils that were within Congress' power to
prevent. 55
Following Schenck, the next significant development in First
Amendment interpretation occurred in Gitlow v. New York. 6 In
Gitlow, the Court determined the constitutionality of a New York
statute which made it illegal to advocate the violent or forceful
overthrow of the government.5 7 Although the Court upheld the va-
lidity of the statute, it extended the scope of the First Amendment
by holding that the right of free speech was included in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of due process and therefore applied
to the states. 8
The Court in Gitlow also strayed from the "clear and present
danger" test, creating a new test by which regulation of speech was
same time, they created the Bill of Rights which consisted of Ten Amendments to the Con-
stitution. Id. The first of these guaranteed, among other freedoms, the freedom of speech.
Id. The Bill of Rights went into effect December 15, 1791. Id. at 1.
Prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights, free speech was guaranteed by several state
constitutions. Id. at 2. However, the substance of these rights varied from state to state. Id.
See note 10 for the text of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
51. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
52. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48. The Espionage Act of 1917 made it a crime to willfully
cause or attempt to cause insubordination in the military or naval forces of the U.S. or to
willfully "obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service." Id. at 48-9.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id.
56. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
57. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 654-55. Petitioner had been convicted under the statute for
writing an article in "The Left Wing Manifesto" and for publishing the paper "Revolution-
ary Age." Id. at 654. These writings violated the statute by advocating the overthrow of the
national government by force, violence and unlawful means. Id.
58. Id. at 666.
1994 945
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to be judged.59 This standard, known as the "bad tendency" test,
was more tolerant of state action, because it permitted the sup-
pression of speech even when such speech had only a natural ten-
dency to bring about the substantive evil which the legislature was
seeking to avoid."0 Under the "bad tendency" doctrine, unlike the
"clear and present danger" test, there was no requirement that the
socially disruptive effect of the speech be foreseeable.6'
In 1927, the Court reiterated the stance it had taken in Gitlow
and upheld the constitutionality of a California Criminal Syndical-
ism Statute in Whitney v. California." In a concurring opinion,
however, Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, preserved the
"clear and present danger" test.6 In reasserting Holmes' reasoning
in Schenck, Justice Brandeis looked to the purpose and intent of
the Constitution's framers in drafting the First Amendment.4 He
argued that freedom to speak one's mind and engage in political
discussion were indispensable to the American frame of govern-
ment, and that in order to justify suppression of free speech, there
must be reasonable grounds to believe that an evil must be immi-
nent and serious. 6 5
59. Id. at 671.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 669. The Court stated that there existed a presumption in favor of the
statute, and that by criminalizing certain conduct, the legislature had already made the
determination that such conduct would have the effect of bringing about certain evils that
were within the state's police power to prevent. Id. at 668.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes applied the "clear and present danger" test and
found that there was no present danger of an attempt by the petitioner and those who
shared his views to overthrow the government. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
62. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
The statute in Whitney made it unlawful to organize, assist in organizing, or become a
member of an association advocating criminal syndicalism. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360. Crimi-
nal syndicalism, as defined by the statute, referred to the "doctrine or precept advocating,
teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage, or unlawful acts of force
and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in
industrial ownership or control or effecting any political change." Id. at 359-60.
The petitioners in Whitney had violated the statute by their association with the Commu-
nist Labor Party of America, which advocated the mobilization of the working class to over-
throw the capitalist government. Id. at 363.
63. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis varied the
test somewhat by replacing the word "present" with "imminent." Id.
64. Id. at 375. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 376. Justice Brandeis stated specifically that "[iln order to support a find-
ing of clear and present danger, it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was
to be expected or advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such
advocacy was then contemplated." Id. Justice Brandeis distinguished advocacy from incite-
ment, claiming that the former lacked the imminence required by the "clear and present
1994 Recent Decisions
Another test for determining the validity of speech regulation
arose from the Supreme Court's opinion in Dennis v. United
States.6 6 Once again, the Court addressed the scope of the First
Amendment, this time with respect to the Smith Act.67 In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Smith Act, the Court postulated a
balancing test that in addition to weighing an individual's First
Amendment rights, also took into account other considerations.
6 8
Among the things to be considered in applying the balancing test
were the state interests in preventing certain evils.69 In Dennis, the
Court found that the state interest in preventing the overthrow of
the government was compelling enough to warrant a restriction on
free speech."°
Going beyond the balancing test of Dennis, the Court in Bran-
denburg v. Ohio7 established a new test for determining the valid-
ity of restrictions on First Amendment rights of free speech. 2 In
stating that the decision in Whitney upholding the "bad tendency"
test had been severely discredited by subsequent decisions, the
Court held that mere advocacy of violence and unlawful means was
not a sufficient reason to restrict speech. 3 Rather, it held that a
danger" test. Id.
66. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
67. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 495. The Smith Act made it illegal to "organize . .. any
society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of the government in the United States by force or violence." 18 U.S.C. § 11
(1946). Petitioners were members of the Communist Party and were found to have advo-
cated the general goals of the party, which included the overthrow of the government by
force and violence, thus violating the Smith Act. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 498.
68. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 503. The Court adopted the approach used by Judge Learned
Hand in the lower court. Id. at 510. Judge Hand's analysis required weighing the gravity of
the danger anticipated against the intrusion into free speech necessary to prevent that dan-
ger from occurring. Id.
69. Id. at 508-09.
70. Id. at 509. The Court pointed out that in cases in which the defendants' convic-
tions under a statute had been overturned, the state interest was deemed not substantial
enough to warrant intrusion into free speech. Id. at 508. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (holding defendant's right to distribute religious literature outweighed the
state's interest in protecting its citizens from fraud in the solicitation of money); West Vir-
ginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that the state could not compel
students to salute the flag in class); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that the
state could not prevent the distribution of religious literature in a company-owned town).
71. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
72. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. Petitioner had been convicted of violating the
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute which made it unlawful to "advocate ...violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."
Id. at 445. Petitioner was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and his participation in a Klan
rally in which a cross was burned was the basis of his conviction under the statute. Id.
73. Id. at 447. The Court specifically overruled Whitney. Id. at 449.
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state could proscribe speech that advocated violence only when
such advocacy was directed to creating and was likely to create
"imminent lawless action." '74
In addition to developing tests and guidelines that focus on the
effects of certain types of speech, the Supreme Court has, in a se-
ries of cases, turned its attention to the nature of certain speech
and the validity of restriction based solely on the content of
speech. 5 The Court first addressed one of these classes of speech
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.7 6 In Chaplinsky, the Court was
required to determine the validity of the petitioner's conviction
under a New Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of certain
language to annoy or offend another individual." In upholding the
conviction of the petitioner and the constitutionality of the statute,
the Court held that "fighting words" were one of the well-defined
and narrow classes of speech, the prevention of which never posed
a threat to the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Throughout the development of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the judiciary has continually attempted to explain exactly
what the word "speech," as used in the First Amendment, encom-
passes. In 1968, in United States v. O'Brien,79 the Court attempted
to establish a guideline for determining when conduct can be la-
beled "speech." 80 In addressing the constitutionality- of a 1965
amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act,81
74. Id.
75. As part of this analysis, the Court has held that certain types of speech do not
enjoy First Amendment protection. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding
that obscenity was not protected speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (hold-
ing that defamatory speech was not protected speech).
76. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
77. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. Specifically, the statute stated that:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or
derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with
intent -to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation.
Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.2 (1941)).
Defendant's actions which violated the statute included calling another individual in pub-
lic "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
78. Id. at 572. As defined by the Court, "fighting words" refer to words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id.
79. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
80. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367. Respondent had burned his draft card in opposition to
the Vietnam War. Id. at 369. He claimed that such conduct was protected by the First
Amendment and, therefore, his conviction for burning his draft card was invalid. Id. at 370.
81. Id. The act was first enacted in 1948, and the 1965 amendment made it a crime if
a person "forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes
948
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the Court stated that there were limits to what can be defined as
speech, and that every conduct which attempted to express an idea
is not speech. 2 The Court asserted that where conduct contained
both speech and non-speech elements, if the government had a
sufficient interest in regulating the non-speech element, such an
interest would justify limited intrusion on the speech element.8 3 In
upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court held that
the government's interest in regulating the non-speech element of
the respondent's conduct, the burning of the draft card, was suffi-
ciently justified.84 It cautioned, however, that the regulation of ex-
pression would not be justified if the interest advanced by the gov-
ernment arose principally out of its desire to suppress thought it
considered to be harmful.8 5
The Supreme Court has on several occasions refused to extend
the scope of protection offered by the First Amendment to certain
classes of speech."6 Continuing from where it left off in O'Brien,
however, the Court, in 1972, asserted that a restriction of free
speech would not be upheld if such a restriction was based solely
on the state's disagreement with the content of or message con-
veyed by the speech.
8 7
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,88 the Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that prohib-
ited picketing within a certain distance of a public school.8 9 In
holding that the ordinance contravened the First Amendment
rights of the respondent, the Court placed great emphasis on the
ordinance's distinction between labor picketing and other types of
any such certificate [draft card]." Id.
82. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. The Court has, however, in several cases found certain
conduct to be deserving of First Amendment protection. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning of the United States flag).
83. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
84. Id. at 377. The Court found the government intrusion justified because it was
within the government's constitutional power, it furthered a substantial government interest
unrelated to the suppression of speech, and the regulation was achieved by the least intru-
sive means. Id.
85. Id. at 377.
86. See note 75 for the classes of speech not protected by the First Amendment.
87. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
88. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Respondent had picketed a Chicago high school with signs
stating that the school discriminated against blacks. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93.
89. Id. at 92-93. The ordinance stated that " '[a] person commits disorderly conduct
when he knowingly . . . [plickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any
• * * school building. . . provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picket-
ing of any school involved in a labor dispute.' " Id. (citations omitted).
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picketing." It further stated that such a distinction denied the use
of a public forum to people with ideas that the state opposed."
While the Court maintained that the state could regulate speech as
to reasonable "time, place and manner," regulation as to content,
as evidenced in Mosley, was constitutionally impermissible.2
In 1992, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,93 the Court
faced its most recent test of the rule laid down in Mosley that the
government cannot regulate speech and expression solely because
of its content and the message it conveys.9 4 In R.A.V., the Court
was required to determine the constitutionality of St. Paul's Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance, which made it a crime to place cer-
tain symbols on public or private property with the purpose of
arousing anger on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender.9
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's char-
acterization of the statute as regulating only "fighting words," the
Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia,96 subse-
quently invalidated the statute on the basis that it prohibited oth-
erwise permissible speech solely because of the subject addressed
by the speech.9 7 Justice Scalia distinguished statutes that proscribe
speech based solely on content from statutes that proscribe certain
classes of speech because those classes have been deemed to have
little social value and deemed not to warrant First Amendment
protection.9
90. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94-95, 100-101.
91. Id. at 96.
92. Id. at 98-99.
93. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
94. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102.
95. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. The statute provided in part:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, character-
ization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disor-
derly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. citing (ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGISLATIVE CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
Petitioners had been convicted under the statute for burning a cross inside the fenced
yard of a black family's home. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
96. Id. Justice Scalia was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. Id.
97. Id. at 2547. The Court added to its line of reasoning developed in O'Brien and
Mosley by asserting that content-based regulations, like the St. Paul ordinance, are pre-
sumptively invalid. Id. at 2548-49.
98. Id. at 2543. Illustrating this distinction, the Court stated that while a statute
could prohibit libel, it could not prohibit only libel involving criticism of the government.
Id. Relying on this reasoning, the Court found the St. Paul statute invalid, not because it
Vol. 32:939950
1994 Recent Decisions
In a concurring opinion,99 Justice White disagreed with Justice
Scalia's reasoning, holding that if the state may regulate "fighting
words," it may regulate any subset or category of "fighting
words." 0 Furthermore, Justice White said that the majority's
opinion blurred the line between the classes of speech which could
be constitutionally regulated because of their content (obscenity,
defamation, "fighting words") and all other expression, which
could only be regulated on the basis of content by the showing of a
"compelling state interest." 101 Although disagreeing with the ma-
jority's reasoning, Justice White did, however, find the statute un-
constitutional because it was overbroad.'
In deciding many cases involving statutory regulation of speech
due to its content or message, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed concern that such statutes violate First Amendment
rights because they are overbroad.'0° In Cox v. Louisiana,04 the
Supreme Court addressed the overbreadth issue in relation to a
Louisiana disturbance of the peace statute.'05 The Court over-
was aimed at restricting "fighting words," but because it was aimed at restricting only those
"fighting words" that insult on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. Id. at 2547.
99. Id. at 2550. (White, J., concurring). In addition to the majority opinion, Justice
White filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor in full and
joined by Justice Stevens in part; Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion; and Justice
Stevens filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices White and Blackmun. Id.
100. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 2554. White further added that the St. Paul ordinance would pass the strict
scrutiny test of establishing a compelling state interest, stating that St. Paul showed, and
that the majority had acceded St. Paul's showing, that the ordinance was enacted to protect
the rights of classes which had been consistently subject to discrimination. Id.
102. Id. at 2560. Justice White found the statute overbroad because it prohibited not
only "fighting words," but also words that cause only hurt feelings, anger or resentment. Id.
at 2559.
103. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see MARTIN H. REDISH. FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 213 (1984).
104. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
105. Cox, 379 U.S. at 544. The statute read in part:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such
that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby . . . crowds or congregates with
others . . . in or upon . . . a public street or public highway, or upon a public side-
walk, or any other public place or building . . . and who fails or refuses to disperse
and move on . . . when ordered to do so by any law enforcement officer . . . or any
other authorized person . . . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.
Id. (citation omitted).
Petitionei had helped organize, led and participated in a civil rights demonstration and
march in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Id. at 539-44. Estimates of the number of people partici-
pating in the demonstration varied from 1500 to 3800. Id. at 540 n.1. The demonstration
ended with a speech by petitioner urging the marchers to engage in sit-in demonstrations at
local lunch counters. Id. at 542-43. Petitioner's actions resulted in his arrest and subsequent
conviction under the aforementioned statute. Id. at 537-38.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 32:939
turned the petitioner's conviction under the statute, holding that
the statute was overbroad.10 6 The statute was overbroad, the Court
reasoned, because it allowed for the punishment of a person's
peaceful expression of unpopular views.10 7 Such expression, contin-
ued the Court, was clearly protected by the First Amendment, and
the inclusion of such constitutionally protected conduct within the
type of conduct prohibited by the statute rendered the statute un-
constitutionally overbroad. 108
Following Cox, the Supreme Court expanded its analysis of the
overbreadth doctrine in the 1973 case of Broadrick v. Oklahoma.10 9
At issue in Broadrick was a state statute which prohibited state
employees from engaging in a wide range of political activities. "0
Petitioners argued that the statute was overbroad because it had
been construed to apply to protected political expression such as
wearing political buttons and displaying bumper stickers.1 ' In up-
holding the validity of the statute, the Court noted that statutes
106. Id. at 552. The Court also concluded that petitioner's actions did not constitute a
breach of the peace under the statute. Id. at 549.
107. Id. at 551. The Court further explained that inviting dispute was one of the main
functions of free speech and that expression of such dispute was clearly within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. Id. at 552. The language of the statute in Cox, continued the
Court, created the situation that a person was as likely to be convicted for innocent speech
as for an actual breach of the peace. Id.
108. Id. at 552. See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1962) (holding that
the state's application of a breach of the peace statute to the peaceful petition of grievances
at the place of state government was a violation of the petitioner's free speech rights); Ter-
miniello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a breach of the
peace statute that prohibited speech which stirred public anger, invited dispute or brought
about unrest).
The Court in Cox also found unconstitutional another statute under which the petitioner
was convicted. Cox, 379 U.S. at 560. That statute prohibited the obstruction of public pas-
sageways. Id. Although the Court recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in keep-
ing its roadways free from obstructions, it found that the Baton Rouge officials could regu-
late expression based on content, because the officials had unlimited discretion in deciding
who could obstruct streets by its granting of permits for parades. Id. at 558.
109. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
110. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 603 n.1. The statute among other things prohibited state
employees from soliciting or receiving political contributions, becoming a member of a polit-
ical party committee, running for public office, participating in the management of a politi-
cal party or engaging in a political campaign. Id. at 605-06.
Petitioners in the case had violated the statute by actively engaging in a reelection cam-
paign and receiving and distributing campaign posters. Id. at 609.
111. Id. at 609-10. The Court recognized that in cases which challenged the constitu-
tionality of a statute on the grounds that it was overbroad, the rules of standing are ad-
justed to allow a party to challenge a statute, not because the party's own constitutional
rights have been violated, but because there is a possibility that the existence of the statute
will cause others, who were not before the Court, to stifle the exercise of their constitutional
rights. Id. at 612.
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which regulate speech in a neutral way, as opposed to statutes
which regulate speech in a discriminatory manner based on con-
tent, face less scrutiny as to the overbreadth issue. " 2 The Court in
Broadrick also added an element to the overbreadth doctrine. " It
stated that when the expression seeking to be regulated by the
statute involves conduct and not merely pure speech, the statute,.
in order to be found unconstitutional, must be found to be sub-
stantially overbroad. 14
It is from the overbreadth doctrine that cases involving penalty
enhancement statutes arise." 5 As a prelude to cases involving ac-
tual penalty enhancement statutes, the Supreme Court in Barclay
v. Florida"6 addressed the propriety of a trial judge's considera-
tion of a defendant's racial motives in deciding the defendant's
sentence.11 7 The defendant in Barclay had been convicted of first
degree murder, and the jury subsequently recommended a life sen-
tence as appropriate punishment. 1 8 Noting that there were aggra-
vating circumstances, the sentencing judge, however, sentenced the
defendant to death." 9 In upholding the defendant's sentence of
death, the Court held that nothing in the Constitution prohibits a
sentencing judge from considering racial motive.'
Following the decision in Barclay, the Court in Dawson v. Dela-
112. Id. at 614.
113. Id. at 615.
114. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. The Court found the Oklahoma statute not to be
overbroad because the statute's prohibitions were closely connected to the partisan political
conduct the legislature was trying to avoid. Id. at 616. It relied on authority from the state
Attorney General's office interpreting the statute to allow private expressions of political
opinions to conclude that constitutionally protected activity was not substantially curtailed.
Id. at 617.
115. See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
116. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
117. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 948.
118. Id. at 944-45. The defendant was a member of the Black Liberation Army, whose
apparent purpose was to start a revolution and race war by indiscriminately killing white
people. Id. at 942. Along with another person, defendant stabbed, shot and killed a white
man and left the following note on the body:
Warning to oppressive state. No longer will your atrocities and brutalizing of black
people be unpunished. The black man is no longer asleep. The revolution has begun
and the oppressed will be victorious. The revolution will end when we are free. The
Black Revolutionary Army. All power to the people.
Id. at 943.
119. Id. at 945. In considering aggravating circumstances, the sentencing judge took
into account the defendant's racial motive in committing the murder. Id. at 948-49.
120. Id. at 949. The Court further concluded that the sentencing judge had not made
an arbitrary decision, but had properly weighed the aggravating factors to determine if they
warranted imposition of the death sentence. Id.
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ware121 addressed the effects on the First Amendment of introduc-
ing into a sentencing hearing evidence that a defendant was a
member of the Aryan Brotherhood. 2 2 The defendant had argued
that because his freedom to associate with the Aryan Brotherhood
was protected by the First Amendment, introduction of evidence
of his association violated his First Amendment rights.1 23 Although
the Court rejected the defendant's argument and held that the
Constitution did not automatically bar from a sentencing hearing
evidence relating to one's beliefs and associations just because they
are protected by the First Amendment, the Court did hold that the
evidence should not have been admitted. 124 It concluded that in
this case, the consideration of racial motive in the sentencing pro-
ceeding violated the defendant's First Amendment rights. 25 The
Court distinguished the situation from Barclay, on the basis that
in Dawson, the introduction of evidence relating to racial motive
had no relevance to the crime the defendant committed.' 2 Rather,
the Court concluded, the evidence related only to the defendant's
abstract beliefs.1
27
In response to the increasing number of hate crimes committed
in his country, Congress in 1990 passed the Hate Crimes Statistics
Act. 28 This legislation requires the collection of data on crimes
that evidence bias and prejudice due to race, religion, ethnicity and
sexual orientation. 129 In compliance with the Hate Crimes Statis-
tics Act, the FBI released its first full report on hate crimes in Jan-
uary 1993, finding that of all hate crimes reported in the United
States in 1991, sixty percent were racially motivated.' 30 It is in re-
121. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
122. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096. The Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist group that
began in California in the 1960s in response to other groups of racial minorities. Id. The
defendant had committed burglary and murder and was subsequently convicted of first de-
gree murder and various other crimes. Id. at 1095. No evidence was introduced at trial
showing that the murder was racially motivated. Id.
123. Id. at 1097.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1098.
126. Id.
127. -Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1098.
128. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
129. Id.
130. 60 Percent of Hate Crimes Tied to Race, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, § 1, at 6. The
FBI stated that 4,558 hate crimes were reported in 1991, of which 2,963 were prompted by
racial bias. Id. Intimidation was the most prevalent type of hate crime, accounting for 33.9%
of the total. Id. Statistics were provided by law enforcement agencies, but participation by
agencies is voluntary under the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, and for the first report, only
2,771 agencies provided information to the FBI, as compared to the 16,000 that provide
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sponse to the prevalence of these types of crimes that Wisconsin
and other states enacted penalty-enhancement statutes,"' as an
exercise of their police powers and in promotion of the health, wel-
fare and safety of their citizens.'
32
In its opinion in Mitchell, the Court gave great weight to the
interest of the state in exercising its police powers and recognized
that the deterrence of hate crimes is a legitimate exercise of such
powers.'33 The Court in Mitchell held that the interest Wisconsin
was promoting went beyond mere disagreement with the defend-
ant's beliefs, and as such, it provided a justification for the pen-
alty-enhancement statute that outweighed any possible infringe-
ment on the defendant's First Amendment rights.
13 4
The application of the balancing test between state interests and
individual rights explains the distinction the Court made between
Mitchell and R.A.V.' 35 The statute in R.A.V. failed to pass consti-
tutional muster because the infringement on First Amendment
rights was more substantial than the infringement of the penalty-
enhancement statute in Mitchell. The statute in R.A.V. was
targeted directly at a constitutionally protected conduct-free ex-
pression. The conduct targeted by the statute in Mitchell, however
was criminal conduct, for which there is obviously no constitu-
tional protection.
Just as the Court's decision in Mitchell seems to flow logically
from its decision in R.A.V., its Mitchell rationale also falls in line
with the decisions in Barclay v. Florida'36 and Dawson v. Dela-
ware.'37 Those cases clearly held that just because speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, it is not barred from being in-
cluded in the determination of a defendant's sentence.'38 If a
person commits a crime against a person based on a hatred of that
person because of race, the criminal's racial prejudice is just as
much the motive for the crime as revenge would be if the criminal
information for the Uniform Crime Reports on crimes such as murder, arson and rape. Id.
131. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2198 n.4 (listing the states that have
enacted penalty-enhancement statutes).
132. Id. at 2198 & n. 4, 2201.
133. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2200. The Court stated that nothing in its decision in RA.V. compelled a
different result than what was reached in Mitchell. Id. See notes 93-102 for a discussion of
R.A.V.
136. See notes 116-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Barclay opinion.
137. See notes 121-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dawson opinion.
138. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1097.
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committed the crime against a person because that person had
murdered the criminal's father. In previous decisions, the Court
has found that a person's motive in committing a crime can be
justification for enhancing the sentence. 139 The Court's decision in
Mitchell is a natural extension of the reasoning in such decisions,
because it merely applies such reasoning to the different motive of
racial prejudice.
Although the Court's decision in Mitchell can be adequately
supported by the line of reasoning in Barclay and Dawson, the
analysis required to determine when racial motive can be consid-
ered to enhance a sentence is not complete. It is clear from Mitch-
ell that a defendant's "abstract beliefs" cannot be considered in
determining sentencing. 40 However, the Court offered little guid-
ance to assist sentencing judges in distinguishing between beliefs
that are "abstract" and beliefs that are relevant to the determina-
tion of motive. It is unclear whether a defendant's racial bias must
be expressed during the commission of the crime or whether ex-
pression just prior to the crime is sufficient. The determination of
what is "abstract" and what is relevant is a determination that
must be addressed by the Court in the future.
Alison T. Fenton
139. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199. The Court stated that motive is one important factor
in determining a defendant's sentence. Id. The Court pointed out that several states have
constitutionally permissible statutes that make the motive of financial gain an aggravating
circumstance that might warrant the enhancement of a defendant's sentence. Id.
140. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
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